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JOHN MARSHALL DAY.
The one hundredth anniversary of John
Marshall's elevation to the office of Chief
Justice of the United States was fitly celebrated by the Allison Society on February 4th. The commemorative address
was delivered by Professor Frederic C.
Woodward before an audience of students
and townspeople which filled the library
of the school.
After sketching the early life of Marshall, his military career and his services
in the legislature and constitutional convention of Virginia, Professor Woodward
spoke in part as follows:
As a result of our attitude of neutrality,
and of our treaty of commerce and amity
with England, the French government
assumed toward us an attitude that fell
just short of war. The French minister
openly scattered the seeds of opposition to
thegovernment among our people; French
privateers preyed upon our commerce; Mr.
Pinckney, our minister to France, was
abruptly ordered out of the country and
threatened with arrest. In this crisis,
President Adams determined to send a
special eiabassy to France,.and selected

Chas. C. Pinckney, Elbridge Gery and
John Marshall to perform the delicate
mission of demanding redress and reparation for the insults and injuries we had
received.
The interesting experiences of these
ambassadors in France we cannot stop to
relate. Suffice it to say that, although
met on every hand by ridicule and reproach; although insulted by a suggestion
of Talleyrand that their mission might be
accomplished by the use of money; and
although their mission was in fact unsuccessful, they bore themselves with dignity
becoming their position and the position
of the nation that they served. The conduct of Marshall especially was marked by
such exceptional caution and firmness
that we find President Adams writing of
him: "Of the three envoys, the conduct of
Marshall alone has been entirely satisfactory, and ought to be marked by the most
decided approbation of the public. He
has raised the American people in their
own esteem; and if the influence of truth
and justice, reason and argument is not
lost in Europe, he has raised the consideration of the United States in that quarter."
And Patrick Henry, his grand old op-
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ponent, wrote to a friend: "Tell Marshall
that I lovc him because he felt and acted
as a Republican and an American."
fn view of these sentiments, it is not
surprising to find that upon his return to
America, Marshall vas greeted with delight by his admiring fellow citizens; was
received at Philadelphia with a triumphal
procession, and at a banquet given him by
Congress, the intimation of Talleyrand
that the American envoys might succeed
in their mission by means of bribery was
referred to in the now familiar sentiment:
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for
tribute."
His diplomatic career thus concluded,
Marshall again sought retirement, but
again he sought it in vain. At theearnest
solicitation of Washington, whose wish to
Marshall was law, he ran for Congress in
the Richmond district, and just as in the
old days when he was in the Virginia Assembly, his neighbors swept away a normal Anti-Federal majority, and chose him
as their representative. By a strange and
melancholy coincidence, almost his first
duty after taking his seat was to announce
to Congress the death of Washington.
"Our Washington," he said, "is no more.
The hero, the patriot, the sage of America,
the man on whom in time of dauger every
eye was turned and all hopes were placed,
lives now only in his own great actions,
and in the hearts of an affectionate and
afflicted people." And then he readtothe
house the resolutions prepared by Richard
Henry Lee, which closed with memorable
words declaring the dead hero to have been
"first in war, first in peace and first in the
hearts of his countrymen."
While a member of Congress, Marshall
made a number of his ablest arguments,
perhaps the greatest of which was that in
opposition to the resolution censuring the
President for surrendering to the British
authorities, one Thomas Nash, claimed as
a British subject, for murder committed on
an English frigate on the high seas. Nash
falsely claiming that he was an American
citizen, impressed by the British service,
and that the crime had been committed in
an attempt to ggin his freedom, popular
sympathy was aroused in his behalf, and
his surrender was declared to be beyond
the power of the executive. Marshall sup-

ported the action of the President in a
speech so exhaustive and so convincing
as to completely silence the opposition,
both in and out of the house. Albert Gallatin had announced that he would reply
to Marshall, but when the great Virginian
sat down, Mr. Gallatin refused to take the
floor, frankly confessingthat the argument
of Ma'rshall was impregnable and unanswerable.
At the close of the session of Congress,
Mr. Marshall accepted the portfolio of
State in President Adams' cabinet, having
during the session declined an appointment to the vacancy in the Supreme Court
which was subsequently filled by the selection of Bushrod Washington.
His service as Secretary of State was
brief, for at the time of his appointment,
the term of President Adams was drawing
to a close. But, as was true of his whole
life, he surrendered his office, only to receive a call to higher service. Chief Justice Ellsworth had resigned from the Supreme Bench, and atMarshall's suggestion
John Jay had been invited to return to his
former position. But he had declined,
and on the 31st of January, 1801, President
Adams wrote a note to the Secretary of
War, requesting him to execute the office
of the Secretary of State, "so far as to affix
the seal of the United States to the enclosed
commission of the present Secretary of
State, John Marshall, of Virginia, to be
Chief Justice of the United States." The
seal was duly affixed, and on the 4th of
February, Marshall took the oath of office,
and sat for the first time on the bench
which he was destined so splendidly to
adorn.
This was indeed the fit crowning of his
career. Though he had already served his
country as soldier, legislator and diplomat,
be was but 46 years of age, and in the very
prime of intellectual vigor. For 84 years
he presided with never failing dignity and
predominating ability over the "most
august tribunal in the world," and it was
only with the closing of his mortal life
that his judicial robes were laid aside.
It is out of the question to attempt, on
such an occasion as this, to discuss the
great judgments which he rendered, or
even to define with any exactness the
work that he accomplished.
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Coming to the bench with absolutely no
judicial experience, he was called upon to
interpret and to enforce the first written
constitution that had ever been the organic
law of any government. There were no
precedents to guide, no authorities to support him. Had the Supreme Court power
to set aside an Act of Congress or a treaty
with a foreign nation? Had Congress
power to pass any law other than such as
were indespensable to the Federal Government? Could a State tax a corporation
created by the United States? Could a
Federal court overthrow the decision of a
State court? Could the Federal Government regulatecommerce within the States?
Su~h were the unprecedented questions
that crowded in rapid succession upon the
consideration of the court. It is not too
much to say that the very existence of
the constitution hinged upon the unaided
judgment of this one man and his associates.
Happily for America, the constitution
was in safe hands, for such was the power
of Marshall's mind, that the most tremendous problems were solved with apparent
ease; the gravest questions answered with
a finality that admitted of no further debate.
Listen to the words of one of the Presidents of the United States. "He (speaking of Marshall) found the Constitution
paper, and he made it power; he found it
a skeleton and clothed it with flesh and
blood."
Listen to the words of Prof. Bryce, a
most impartial as well as discriminating
critic of American institutions: "It is
hardly an exaggeration to say that the
American Constitution as it now stands,
is the work, most of all, of one man, the
great Chief Justice Marshall."
Listen to the generous words of one who
sat beside him on the bench, Mr. Justice
Story: "His proudest epitaph may be written in a single line-Here lies the Expounder of the Constitution of the United
States."
Such was the character and the magnitude of the judicial service of John Marshall. That his is the brightest name
in the annals of American jurisprudence
has never been questioned; that he ranks
by the side of the greatest masters of the

Common Law is now freely acknowledged
in England aswell as in America. Inthe
realm of constitutional law he occupies, by
common consent, the position which in
equity belongs to Nottingham and Hardwicke, in admiralty to Stowell, in commercial law to Lord Mansfield.
Like
Mansfield, he served his country not only
upon the bench but in the balls of legislature and the councils of government, and
like him, he won fame as a judge not by
reason of depth of learning, but by reason
of inflexible integrity and an extraordinary clarity of mental vision.
In the contemplation of such a character
and of such a life, we know not whether to
chiefly attribute hiis greatness to the genius
of his mind or the nobility of his soul.
Like Washington, John Hampden and
Abraham Lincoln, his character was of
such perfect development that we are unable to definitely distinguish the line between his moral and mental nature and to
determine whether the predominate motive power of his life is to be found in the
righteousness of his heart, or in the sagacity of his brain. Indeed, it seems as though
the giant forces of goodness and greatness,
so rarely found together as to be often regarded as inimical, had, by the beneficent
power of Freedom, been welded togetherin
the making of a prince among men; a man
such as Freedom alone knows how to
make; a man the memory of whom should
be cherished by every lover of Freedom in
his heart of hearts forever.

THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
During the past month the programmes
of the society have all been of an interesting and beneficial character, and have
proven of much help to the members.
The society is enjoying much prosperity
and the members show a gratifying interestinits work. Several interesting papers
have been given, notably, those by Mr.
Kaufman on "Society," by Mr. Helriegel
on "Stenography" and Mr. Rodgers on
"Indian Customs."
On Monday, February 4th, the society
held a public and open commemorative
meeting in celebration of "John Marshall
Day," an able and deeply interesting lec-
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ture on Chief Justice Marshall being delivered by Prof. Frederic C. Woodward in
the Law School Library, before a large
audience of students and townspeople.
Great credit is due the executive committee for the careful and efficient arrangeinents made for this event.
The regular election of officers occurred
on Friday, February 15, the result being
as follows:
President-B. B. Barr.
Vice President-Frank Conry.
Secretary-Joseph P. McKeehan.
Treasurer-Jasper Alexander.
Executive Committee-Nicholls, chairman, Kemp and Marx.
It is hoped that every member will make
a serious effort to be present at every
meeting, for the cultivation of the faculty
of ready speech in public is an invaluable
branch of a lawyer's training, and it is
earnestly hoped that a full attendance will
aid the efforts of the officers in preparing
work for the society.

THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
During the past month the society has
enjoyed a series of pleasant and profitable
meetings. The postponement of the intersociety debate has lessened somewhat the
general interest in the practice of controversial speaking. One debate only has
been recently held. The question: "Is
military renown a fit object of ambition ?"
was discussed by Clark andWatson against
Stauffer and Claycomb. Recitations have
been rendered by Messrs. Claycomb, Detrick, Keelor, Williamson and Schantz.
Several subjects of a technical character
have been discussed by members who were
well prepared on the questions submitted
to them. The subsidy bill, by Peightel;
Woman's Suffrage, by Osborne; Dower in
Pennsylvania, by Boryer: and interesting
papers. by Vastine and Hickernell were
among these. An oration by Mr. J. Brooks
was a much appreciated feature of one of
the programs. On the evening of February 8th, the society again had the privilege
of listening to some of Mr. C. M. Staufer's
violin music.
The lecture by Professor F. C. Woodward, under the auspices of the Allison

Society, was the prominent feature of an
unusually pleasant occasion. Thelecturer
proved his ability as an entertainer as well
as an instructor. The prominent life and
enviable character of Justice Marshall furnished the basis for a biographical sketch,
which appealed alike to the ambitions
and to the noblest sentiments of the student audience.
The lecture was interspersed with amusing and illustrative anecdotes concerning the great man.

WEORCAN CLUB.
The chief objects of this Club are literary
culture, familiarity with parliamentary
law and practice in the art of extempore
speech. A well-rounded lawyer possesses
all of these accomplishments. Do you
possess them? This question we put to
ourselves and answer it with labor.
We devoted last term to the study of
Evangeline, debates upon current questions and occasional practice in parliamentary law. This term the study of King
Richard III is in progress and we hope to
master many of the little niceties of the
English language thereby.
The Nicaraguan Canal, the status of
Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines
formed the main topics for debate, while a
number of public as well as personal matters furnished subjects for extemporaneous
talks. Many new members have been admitted and present prospects cause us to
anticipate a very successful year.

DR. REED'S LECTURE.
On Friday evening, January 25th, 1901,
Dr. Reed delivered a lecture under the
auspices of the Dickinson Society, in the
Law School building. The subject of the
discourse was, "Public Speaking." Much
valuable instruction was given concerning
the art of oratory. The speaker devoted
his attention.particularly to the physical
accompaniments of correct delivery. The
value of a correct carriage; of a strong and
well regulated voice; of facial expression;
of graceful and expressive gestures, and of
a generally effective bearing, were touched
upon. The various points were illustrated
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by the speaker in his own delivery, in a
most effective manner. This is the first
of a series of lectures to be delivered by
Dr. Reed upon the general subject of public speaking. The President's treatment
of the subject is of great practical value to
the student body. His arguments for and
demonstration of the efficacy of ability
along this line were most convincing. In
spite of the fact that the lecturer occupied
the position of an instructor in his discourse, he proved to be a marked success
as an entertainer. Instruction and entertainment formed a happy combination.
As an appropriate addendum tothelecture,
the Doctor recited "Hamlet's Speech to
the Players." This was rendered in a
manner which called forth the enthusiasm
and approbation of the audience.

Claude L. Roth, '98, who in '99 entered
the collegiate department of the University
of Pennsylvania, was chosen as one of the
orators to represent the University in the
debate with Ann Arbor, Mich. Thequestion to be debated is: "Resolved, That
United States Senators should be elected
by direct vote of the people." The University will take the negative side.

ex-CHIEF JUSTICE STERRETT.

ALUMNI NOTES.
J. Harris Curran, '96, formerly of Tome
Institute, Port Deposit, Md., has accepted
an assistant professorship of Economics in
tha Leland Stanford University of California. In June last he took the degree of
Ph. D. at the University of Halle, Germany.
L. M. Sebring, '00, is at present in the
law offices of Hice and Hice, Beaver, Pa.
Niel C. McEwen, '93, has gone to Salem, W. Va., where he intends to reside
permanently and practice his profession.
FrankJ. Laubenstein, '99, is in the office
of MacHenry Wilhelm, Ashland, Pa.
Miss Sara Marvel, '00, spent several days
in town about January 28, 1901.
William H. Stamey, '96, was in town
quite recently. He is at present located in
Pittsburg.
H. M. Collins, '00, is practicing law at
Parksburg, W. Va.
Harry W. Minnich, '92, was in town for
a few hours quite recently.

ex-Chief Justice Sterrett, the subject o
this sketch and who expired so suddenly
January 22, 1901, was at one timea student
at the Reed Law School, now known as
the Dickinson School of Law.
Judge Sterrett was born in Juniata
county, November 7, 1822. He acquired
his early education in the public and select schools in the neighborhood and during the working season he assisted his
father on -the farm. He graduated from
Jefferson College in 1845. In 1846 he resolved to devote all his time to the study
of law, and entered as a student in the
Reed Law School, and after spending a
year at this institution he entered the University of Virginia, from which he graduated. In May, 1848, he was licensed to
practice in Virginia, and in September of
the same year he was admitted to practice
in his native county. In 1849 he located
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in Pittsburg and commenced the practice
of his profession with Thomas H. Baird.
In 1861 he was appointed on the Commission to revise the Revenue Laws of the
Commonwealth, and in January, 1862, he
was appointed President Judge of the Fifth
Judicial District, to fill the vacancy caused
by the death of William B. McClure. In
October he was elected for the full term of
ten years, and in 1872 he was unanimously
re-elected. On February 26, 1877, he was
appointed as justice of the Supreme Court
to fill the vacancy caused by the death of
Justice Henry W. Williams, and in the
following year he was elected to the full
term of twenty-one years. Upontheresignation of Chief Justice Paxson, February
21, 1893, he was commissioned as Chief
Justice and continued to serve in that capacity until the first Monday in January,
100. It will be seen from this summary
that Judge Sterrett, from May, 1848, to the
expiration of his term in the Supreme
Court, was actively engaged in the practice
of his profession or in the performance of
his judicial duties in the Common Pleas
or in our court of last resort. In the performance of his professional or judicial
duties he was faithful to the trust reposed
in him, and his integrity and fair dealing
were never questioned. The record he
has made will stand to his credit without
blemish while the remembrance of him
remains. He was a just and able judge,
honorable in all his relations, and a useful
and exemplary citizen. The members of
the Supreme Court, who were associated
with him for many years, were strongly
attached to him. Whether in his own
home, in court or in consultation, he was
the same unassuming and agreeable gentleman. He firmly adhered to his duly
considered convictions, and he conceded
to his associates theright which he claimed
for himself.
BOOK REVIEWS.
"Owen's Law Quizzer," by Wilbur A.
Owen, LL. M., of the Toledo bar, 613
pages, published by West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul, Minn. Price $3.50.
The increasing demand for a book of
this nature, we presume, has led the author
to revise and enlarge his first edition, a

small hand-book of something over 200
pages. The second edition of Owen's Law
Quizzer contains questions and answers on
25 of the most important branches of the
law, in fact it may be called a condensed
encyclopedia of the law, especially valuable to the student who uses the Hornbook
series.
"Tabular Analyses of Code Pleading,
Equity, Real Property, Contracts and
Evidence," by Clay, Turnipseed, Jordan
and Minnig, published by W. H. Anderson and Co., Cincinnati, Ohio.
The Analyses have been primarily designed for the use of law students, in connection with their work and for final review.
The outline gives in compact form, easily
comprehended, not only all the essential
principles upon which the subjects are
based, but also shows the law as it is today. To students preparing for bar examinations these analyses are of inestimable
value; they not only contain an analysis
of the several subjects, but give concise
and satisfactory definitions of the several
subjects treated therein. Price$1.00 eaoh.
"The Philippines: The War and the
People," by Albert G. Robinson. Published by McClure, Phillips & Co., New
York, 1901. Pp. xIx, 407. Price $1.50.
The major portion of this book consists
of letters which were sent to the New York
"Evening Post" by the author in his capacity as staff correspondent for that paper. Mr. Robinson's prolonged stay in
the Philippines and his thoughtful study
of the islands and their inhabitants make
his opinions of especial value at this time.
A careful perusal of the book will show
that the author has not been hampered by
prejudices influenced by partisan politics.
The reading of this interesting book will
assist materially to an understanding and
intelligent solution of the great Philippine
problem.
In this narrative of personal experience
and observation, with discriminating and
sympathetic touch, Mr. Robinson brings
before his reader the real Philippino-the
man, his character, his manner of life, his
necessities and his hopes.
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"Episodes from 'The Winning of the
West,"' by Theodore Roosevelt. G. P.
Putnam's Sons, New York. Pp. xv, 247.
Illustrated. Price $2.60.
This little book in admirable style presents the more dramatic incidents in the
western movement of our people. Indian
tribes and wars, frontier life, hunters and
trappers, explorers, adventurers, settlers
and settlements, customs and modes of
life are woven in the narrative, but with
such exactness and detail as at once both
satisfy the claims for historical merit and
please the literary reader and critic.
The West had grown with the growth
of agiant. "Much had been accomplished
by the deeds of the Indian-fighters, treatymakers and wilderness-wanderers; far
more had been accomplished by the steady
push of the settler folk themselves, as
they thrust ever westward and carved
states out of the forest and prairie."
"Columbia Law Review." We greet
with pleasure the first edition ofrthe Columbia Law Review, published by the students of Columbia Law School, a neat and
attractive publication of 70 pages.
THE Fonum congratulates the Editors
on the first number, which, if taken as
their standard, success is already assured.
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The following is a continuation of the
schedule of counsel in the Moot Court
cases issued in last month's FoRum.
Plaintiff.

Kemp,
Katz.
MacConnell, J.
Edwards,
Boryer,
Minnich,
Lonergan,
Harpel, J.
MacConnell,
McIntyre,
Rhodes, F.,
Points.
Stauffer, J.
Valentine,
Shipman,
Stauffer,
Hess.
Clark, J.
Elder,
Claycpmb,
Detrich,
Barr.
Kern, 3.
Kaufman,
Phillips,
Wright,
Peightel.
Elmes', 3.
Bishop,
Hickernell,
Longbottom,
Donahoe.
Kostenbauder, 3.
Fox,
Cooper,
Kline, C. S.,
Mays.
McIntyre, 3.
Ebbert,
Core,
Dever,
Yeagley.
Osborne, 3.
Gross,
Crary,
Gerber,
Jones.
Detrich, 3.
Williamson,
Welsh,
Mundy,
Watson.
McKeehan, 3.
Adamson,
McKeehan,
Davis,
Rhodes, 3.
Valentine, 3.

Defendant.

Case No. 79. Kemp,
Marx,
Frank,
Kline, Dan.
Katz, 3.
80. Peightel,
Hoagland,
Dever,
Bouton.
Kemp, J.
81. McGuffie,
Schanz,
Cannon,
Vastine.
Brock, 3.
82. Osborne,
Moon,
Kostenbauder, McKeehan.
Brooks, 3.
S"'
83. Shomo,
Walsh,
Brenan,
Lambert.
Minnich, 3.
"
1 84. Miller,
Lauer,
Mowry,
Rogers.
Moon, 3.
85. Nichols,
Elmes,

MOOT COURT.
JONES vs. KAM4S.
Constructionof will-eaningof' 'family"
"1desire."1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Jones, by will, gave to his son
Joel "the farm on which I now reside"
and "at his death I desire that his family
shall take it in equal shares." Joel, when
the will was written, was 11 years old, and
when the testator died 12. After reaching
majority, and being in possession of the
farm, he contracted under seal to sell it to
Kames for $10,000. Kames, denying that
Jones had a fee, refused to accept the deed
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(which named "Karper Kames, his heirs
and assigns" as the grantee) and to pay
the purchase money. Assumpsit.
CORE for plaintiff.
1. Plaintiff took a fee because
a. Presumption in favor of a fee. Fulton
v. Fulton, 2 Grant 28.
b. Testator expressed only desire, hence
plaintiff takes fee under Act 1883, P. & L.
1446.
c. Devise of realty "family" is construed
as heirs. Brown v. Higgs, 4 Vesey. 719;
Wright v. Atkyns, 17 Vesey. 719.
2. Devise to "family" void for uncertainty, then plaintiff has fee under Act of
1833.
3. Mere precatory words will not make
devisee a trustee. Burt v. Henon, 66 Pa
402.
DEVER and WILLIAmsoN for defendant.
Word "desire" is mandatory. Oyster v.
"Family" means
Knull, 137 Pa. 448.
Jarman on Wills; Oyster v.
children.
Knull.
Words "in equal shares" shows testator
meant family as children, then plaintiff
held life estate only.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Undoubtedly if the testator In this case
had devised the "farm on which I now reside, "without further provision, Joel Jones
would take a fee simple under the Act of
1833, 1 P. &. L. 1446. But he follows these
words with the phrase, "at his death I
desire that his family shall take it in equal
shares." The interpretation to be placed
upon this phrase is the determining point
in the case.
We cannot support the contention of the
plaintiff that the word "desire" is precatory, since it does not express a wish that
ah act be done by some person named, but
is used to express the intention of the testator. Taylor v. Martin, 8 Cent. 139. See
also Fox's Appeal, 99 Pa. 382.
Our next duty is to determine the meaning of the word "family." At one time
this word was considered as of indefinite
meaning unless aided by the context. Doe
v. Joinville, 3 East 172. We know of no
jurisdiction in which the Common Law
prevails which holds to this view at present. This view was followed by that which
holds that in gifts of realty "family" primarily means heirs. Brown v. Higgs, 4
Ves. 719; Wright v. Atkyns, 17 Ves. 257;
Chattaway v. Smith, 5 Maule & Sel, 126.
The plaintiff contends that this is the con-

struction to be placed on the will in question and that he therefore takes a fee under the rule in Shelly's case. If his premises are correct his conclusion must follow. But we can find no decision in Pennsylvania which holds that "family" primarily means heirs though there is a halfhearted dictum to that effect in Week v.
Clippinger, 5 Pa. 385. And even in the
jurisdiction from which the plaintiff's
cases are cited the rule has been changed,
and now the primary meaning of "family"
is children,*hich meaning can be changed
only by evidence from the context showing
that the testator intended otherwise, Jarman on Wills, Vol. 2, p. 631; Pigg v.
Clarke, 3 Ch. D. 672; Wood v. Wood, 3
Hare 65; Snow v. Teed, L. R., 9 Eq. 622.
This view is strengthened in the present
case by the provision that the "family
shall take it in equal shares" (Burt v.
Hellyan, L. R., 14 Eq. 160), and is therefore adopted by the court in the case at bar.
The word "family" with this meaning
attache to it is therefore a word of purchase (Oyster v. Knull, i37 Pa. 448), and
Joel Jones takes only a life estate (Weck
v. Clippinger, supra; Curtis v. Longstreth,
44 Pa. 297) and cannot give afee according
to contract.
On the case stated the judgmeat is for
the defendant.
W. T. STAUFFER, J.
GEORGE RAUGHTON vs. PERCY
WOODRUFF.
Action in assumpsit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Woodruff, intending to erect a new factory, advertised for bids. After opening
the bids, he met Haughton and shook
hands with him, saying: "You were the
lowestbidder, and therefore the lucky man.
I hope you will call and see me to-morrow
and sign the written contract." Haughton called the next day and was then informed that while his bid was the lowest,
Woodruff had decided not to have him
build the factory. In the meantime,
Haughton had purchased material which
lie was compelled to re-sell at a loss of
$1,000. He also contends that by reason
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of defendant's breach of contract, he lost a
contemplated profit of $2,000.

WM. JOHNS vs. R. R. CO.

LONGBOTTom and MILLER for plaintiff.
1. Proof of part performance by plaintiff
under a contract, the existence of which
is afterwards denied by defendant, will
entitle plaintiff to recover for the part performance withoutproofoffull performance.
Stewart v. Short, 130 Pa. 395.
2. Where a conversation is relied upon
as proof of an agreement, it is for the jury
to decide whether such a meeting of minds
took place as to constitute a valid contract. 1 Cush. 89.
McGuFFiE and VASTINE for defendant.
1. The fact that it is customary to award
the contract to the lowest bidder does not
compel the person receiving the bids so to
award it. Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Pa. 453;
Leskie v. Haseltine, 155 Pa. 98.
2. If the parties agree to have the contract reduced to writing and signed, there
is no obligation created until this is done.
Martland v. Wilcox, 17 Pa. 232; Brown v.
Finney, 53 Pa. 373; Leskie v. Haseltine, 155
Pa. 98.

.Negligence-Assumpsit to recover
damages.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question in the case is, did the words
ofWoodruffon meeting Haughton amount
to an acceptance of Woodruff's offer? We
think it did not. The fact that Haughton
was the lowest bidder gave him no right to
the awarding of the contract, nor did the
fact that Woodruff declared him the lucky
man, Leskins v. Raseltine, 155 Pa. 98, nor
did the fact that Woodruff requested
Haughton to call and sign the written
contract establish a contract between the
parties.
It is clear that it was the intention of
the defendant that he should not be bound
until all of the terms of the contract were
reduced to writing and signed by the parties. MacMackin & Young v. Timmins,
14 W. N. 318; Maitland v. Wilcox, 17 Pa.
231.
We do not think that the doctrine of
Patton's Executors v. Hassinger, 69 Pa.
311, is applicable to the ease at bar. In
that case the defendant's intestate made an
offer to any one who might accept, which
offer was actually accepted by the plaintiff,
thus forming a contract. In this ease
Haughton made the offer and could not
therefore accept it, that being the privilege
of Wcodruff. We therefore conclude that
there was no valid contract and enter
judgment for the defendant.
KENNEDY, J.

STATEMENT -OF THE CASE.

The defendant had a road connecting
New Orleans and intermediate points with
Philadelphia and New York. It frequently carried cattle in its cars, coming from
Texas. In the summer of 1900 it carried
cattle from Texas, some of which had the
splenic or Texas fever. Johns shipped a
few days after 40 head of cattle from a point
in Franklin county to a point near Carlisle.
At the last place they were placed on a
farm and in a few days 30 of them became
sick and 23 of them died. There had not
been splenic fever in this part of Pennsylvania and the cattle had been bred in
Franklin andnever in contact with foreign
cattle. Alleging that the fever was communicated to his cattle by the defendant's
cars, Johns sues in assumpsit.
DEAL and LAUER for plaintiff.

1. One guilty of an act of negligence will
be held to have foreseen, and be held responsible for whatever consequences resulted from his negligence, without the intervention of some other independent
agency, disconnected from the primary
fault and self operating, although, in advance, the actual result may have seemed
impossible. Imgley v. Canal Co, 142 Pa.
388.
2. That cattle coming from Texas during
the spring and summer months are often
infected with a contagious disease is a notorious fact. 129 U. S. 217.
3. When injuries result from known
causes which can be explained on no other
theory than that of the negligence of the
carrier, the presumption of negligence
arises. 168 Pa. 209.
4. The common law duties and liabilities
of common carriers attach to the carriers
of live stock. Ratz v. Penna R. R., 3
Phila. 82.
KATz and SCHNEE for defendant.
1. A commofi carrier does not insure
against death or disease generally, but only
as it may be the result of negligence in the
course of carriage; and the burden of proving negligence is on the plaintiff. P. A.
R. Co. v. Raitdon, 119 Pa. 577; Foirhy v.
P. R. R. Co. 17 W. N. C. 177; Adams Express Co. v. Sharpless Sons, 77 Pa. 517.
2. The, carrier's liability is especially
contingent upon the inherent vice, diseases
or condition of the animals shipped.
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Blower v. R. R. L. R., 76 Pa. 655; Warden
v. Grier, 6 Watts. 424.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
After careful consideration the court has
arrived at the conclusion that the evidence
is sufficient to warrant us in submitting
the case to your consideration.
Johns, the plaintiff, seeks to recover
from the defendant company for the loss
of twenty-three (23) head of cattle, which
defendant company transported in their
cars from Franklin county, Pa., to a point
near Carlisle, Pa. It appears that defendant company during the summer of 1900
had carried cattle in its cars some of which
had Texas or splenic fever. It also appears
that there had not been splenic fever in
this section of Pennsylvania, and also that
plaintiff's cattle had never been in contact
with foreign cattle. A few dpys after the
arrival of these cattle at their destination
this splenic fever set in with the above
named results. The plaintiff alleges that
the fever was communicated to his cattle
by the defendant company's cars. This,
we apprehend, is a question for your determination.
Therefore, gentlemen, if you find that
the plaintiff's cattle contracted zhis fever
from the defendant company's cars, the
burden being on him to show that they
could not have otherwise contracted said
disease, your verdict should be in favor of
the plaintiff.
On the other hand if you find that the
plaintiff has merely shown the infection
of his cattle with this fever, and has failed
to show that they could only have contracted it from the cars of the defendant
company, your verdict should be for the
defendants.
W. H. TAYLOR, J.

WM. BIDDLE vs. HENRY STOUT.
Implied surrender by tenant to landlord.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Holmes leased for 4 years a building to
Biddle who, a few weeks afterwards, sublet to Stout the upper story of it. Stout
remained in possession for 21 years, when

he moved out, and notified Biddle that he
had done so, because unable to pay the
rent, and asking Biddle to accept a surrender of the premises. To this Biddle
made no reply. Stout had nothing further
to do with the premises, and two weeks
after first notice to Biddle, Biddle with
the consent of Holmes surrendered his
lease, and Holmes took possession of all the
premises, including the upper story. Five
years after Stout requested that his surrender should be accepted, Biddle brought
this action of debt for the rent for one and
a halfyears, none of which Stout had paid.
The Court refused to permit the jury to
find that Biddle had accepted Stout's surrender, and instructed the jury to find for
plaintiff the rent for one and a half years,
viz: $300.
SCHANZ and SHERBINE for appellant.

The landlord impliedly accepted the
surrender of the premises; by his silence,
by his laches in bringing suit, and by his
surrender to the original lessor without
mention of the sub-lease. Weightman v.
Harley, 20 W. N. C. 470; Lux v. Hoggin,
69 Cal. 255; Talbot v. Whipple, 14 Allen
180.
The surrender of the lessee removes the
liability of the sub-lessee for rent. Pratt
v. Richards Co., 69 Pa. 53; Eten v. Luyster, 60 N. Y. 252.
MowBY and SHomo for appellee.
In an action for rent where the lessee
claims to be released by reason of a surrender, he must prove clearly an acceptance
by the lessor; and mere silence does not
constitute such acceptance. Reeves v.
McCamsky, 168 Pa. 571; Teller v. Boyles,
132 Pa. 56; White v. Corlies, 46 N. Y 467;
R. R. Co. v. Echteracht, 21 Pa. 220; Ueberrath v. Reigel, 71 Pa. 280.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Surrenders, however, are not only in
writing, but by act and operation of law.
A surrender in law is a surrender which is
implied from the acts of the parties, whenever they are so inconsistent with the relation of landlord and tenant as manifestly
to indicate an intention on both sides to
determine it, as, where a lessee for a certain
term accepts a lease for a different or
shorter term, or where both parties actually
substitute, by agreement, another tenant.
The express consent, however, of all the
parties is necessary to create a surrender
at law, and the act done must be unequiv-
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ocal, for if they be susceptible of an explanation at variance with the intention of
the surrendering the lease, they will not
be considered as a surrender. Then if the
landlord put up a bill for rent, signifying
that they are to be let, after the tenant has
quit without notice, it will not be considered as an act implying a surrender, because it is easily explicable upon a different supposition, for the letting might be
for the benefit of the lessee; so, also, if during a letting from year to year, the landlqrd, with his tenant's consent, accept and
treat a third as his own tenant, it amounts
to a surrender in law, of the original tenant's interest. But it must be a cleartase
of substitution, and merger of the old
tenant's interest. Merely taking rent from
the new occupier is not sufficient. Pratt
v. Richards, 69 Pa. 53.
If there was a release and acceptance,
the lessee would be estopped from claiming
rent while he held the possession. This
plaintiff we think is in this category. If
his lease was taken off his hands, what
right has he to claim rent for the premises?
He is no longer a landlord. In fact his surrender acquitted him of rent.
Marsilles et al v. Kerr, 6 Wharton 500,
where a tenant vacates the premises before
the expiration of the lease, and lessor
afterwards leases it to a second tenant.
The first tenant is only liable for the
amount of rent that accrued between the
time of his leaving the premises and the
11 W. N. C.
time it was again rented.
213. The landlord has a perfect right to
hold tenant liable for the balance of rent
remaining due after allowance for amount
received from subsequent tenant. Auer
v. Penn, 99 Pa. 375. Nor does the renting of the premises to another tenant under such circumstances raise such presumption, for the reason that it is manifestly to the lessee's interest that they
should be occupied.
The landlord may allow the property to
stand idle, and hold the tenant for the entire rent, or he may lease it and hold him
for the difference, if any. If there was a
surrender and acceptance, the lessee would
be estopped from claiming rent while he
held the premises. Thisplaintiff, we think,
is in this category. If their lease was
taken off their hands, what right have

they to claim rent for the premises? They
are no longer landlords. In fact, their
surrender acquitted them of rent, as it did
their lessees. We tfiink this being the appearance of the case as it has been presented, the lower court was in error.
Judgment reversed.
LoRRin R. HOLCOMB, P. J.

FRANK BURDICK vs. EUGENE
CLARK.
Contractsfor services implied in law and
in fact--endering aid at fires.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The stable of Clark was burning down
when Burdick happened to drive past in a
carriage with one Tiffany. Burdick said
to Tiffany-"My time is valuable, but I
suppose I ought to help Clark save his property. He is square and he will pay me for
it." He then left the carriage and went to
the aid of Clark, saving several horses from
the flames. In doing so he was himself
severely burned, and was unable to work
for a month, losing wages to the amount
of $80 and paying a physician's bill of $25.
W. L. SHIPmAN and JOHN KEmP for
the plaintiff.
1. Generally when services have been
rendered by one person to another, the law
presumes a promise on the part of him who
has received them to pay what the services
were really worth. Snyder v. Steinmetz,
6 Sup. Ct. 341; Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass.
286; Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. 107.
2. Bartholomew v. Jackson criticised:
Keener on Quasi-Contracts, p. 355.
ALFRED VALENTINE and W. H. TAYLOR

for defendant.
1. Services such asthe plaintiff rendered
are presumed to be rendered gratuitously.
Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 468; Keener on
Quasi Contracts, 354; Bartholmew v. Jackson, 20 Johns 28.
2. A voluntary act, performed without
request does not, although beneficial to another, afford a legal course of action for
compensation. That the act was necessary
does not alter the case. Bartholmew v.
Jackson, 20 Johns 28; Anderson v. Hamilton, Twp. 25 Pa. 75; Webb v. School, 3
Phila. 125; Jones v. Woods, 76 Pa. 408.
3. The declarations of Burdick are selfserving statements, made in the absence
of the defendant, and hence inadmissible
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as they cannot affect hisliability; Demsey
v. Dobson, 174 Pa. 122; Thomas v. Miller,
165 Pa. 216; Wilt v. Snyder, 17 Pa. 77.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff, while saving the property
of the defendant from a burning building,
received injuries which prevented him
from following his usual vocation for the
period of one month, thereby losing wages
to the amount of $80, and incurring an exbense of $25 for medical attendance. He
seeks to recover what his services were
reasonably worth. He was not requested
by the defendant to assist in saving this
property but performed these services voluntarily. Is there such an implied contract as will permit the plaintiff to recover? Where services are performed by
one for another, either with or without the
latter's consent and knowledge, and he
knowingly accepts and avails himself of
these services, the law will imply a promise
to pay a fair and reasonable compensation
therefor: Com. v. Buchanan, 6 Kulp 217;
Curry v. Curry, 114 Pa. 367; Smith v.
Milligan, 43 Pa. 107.
It is well established in Pennsylvania
that services rendered without request and
without a subsequent promise to pay shall
be deemed voluntary, and that no compensation can be recovered for such services
whether the person performs the services
with or without expectation of reward:
Webb v. School, 3 Phila. 12.5; Anderson v.
Hamilton Township. 25 Pa. 75; Jackson v.
Brown, 5 Forum 70. That the plaintiff
expected to be paid for the work would
certainly not be sufficient to establish the
existence of a contract. It must beshown
that, in some manner, the party sought to
be charged assented to it: Day v. Caton,
119 Mass. 513.
A. voluntary act, although beneficial to
another, performed without request, affords no legal cause of action for compensation: Jones v. Woods, 76 Pa. 408; Anderson
v. Hamilton Township, supra; Boston Ice
Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28; Bartholomew
v. Jackson, 20 Johns 28. It would beagainst
public policy to permit a contract to be implied from the fact that the plaintiff assisted in saving some of the defendant's property from the burning building. Services
of this nature are presumed to be rendered

gratuitously.

If a man's house takes fire,

the law does not presume or imply a contract to pay his neighbors for their services
in saving his property. The common principles of human conduct mark kindness as
the motive ofaction; and therefore, by common custom, compensation is not counted
on: Hertzog v.Hertzog,29 Pa.468; Bartholomew v. Jackson, supra. Since the plaintiff will not be permitted to recover for the
reasons given above, it will be unnecessary
to give an opinion on the alleged improper
testimony which was received in evidence
without objection.
Judgment for defendant.
SAMUEL E. BASEHORE, J.

WM. RISK vs. CHARLES NOBLET.
Fraud-Negligenceof grantor.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Noblet, owning a farm, executed a paper
brought to him by John Harris, and represented by the latter to b.e a promissory
note. Noblet was blind, but could write
his name quite legibly when his hand was
placed at the proper spot on the paper.
The paper actually presented to him was
a deed conveying his farm. Harris put
the deed on record, being h tenant already
in possession of the farm. Harris then
borrowed $5000 from Risk, and executed as
security therefor, a mortgage on the farm,
Risk first examining the record and discovering there, the conveyance to Harris.
A sci. fa. being issued, judgment was obtained and the land sold by the sheriff,
Risk becoming the purchaser.
Noblet
meantime having taken possession, this
ejectment was brought against him.
MuNDY and E.A. DELANEY for plaintiff.
Counsel for the plaintiff cited Green v.
Buffalo, 56 Pa. 110; Duff v. Patterson, 159
Pa. 312; Wellers Appeal, 103 Pa. .594; Devor
v. Brandt, 53 N. Y. 462.
LEROY DELANEY and CLAYCOMB for
defendant.
Fraud vitiates a conveyance. Babcock
v. Case, 61 Pa. 427; Pearsoll v. Chapin, 44
Pa. 9; Louden v. Blythe, 16 Pa. 533; S. C.,,
27 Pa. 22; Lewis v. Lewis, 6 S. & R. 489.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

If this were the first case of its kind to
be adjudicated and the law were unsettled
on the questions involved, the importance
of deciding such a case would undoubtedly
be great, had we no precedents to follow.
The adjudicated cases give us a clear and
comprehensive insight of the questions
involved and enable us to apply the law
as it is to-day, with a clear conscience, that
justice both legal and equitable will be
administered to the parties concerned.
There is no doubt in our mind, but that
when Harris brought to Noblet the deed,
purporting to be a promissory note, and
had him affix his signature to it, he perpetrated a fraud upon him. He induced
Noblet to sign a paper which he otherwise
wofid not have signed had he known its
true intent and purpose. But, by whose
permission was this fraud perpetkated? by
Noblet himself and no one else. It is true
that Noblet was a blind man and is to be
pitied for the misfortune which nature has
inflicted upon him, but there is nothing in
the case which would tend to disprove but
that he was a man of sufficient intellect
and was fully capable of comprehending
the difference between a deed and promissory note. The facts in this case show
that Noblet did not make any inquiry
concerning the instrument before signing,
nor did he demand to have it read or explained to him. His failure to follow these
requirements of the law constituted him
negligent, and such negligence certainly
deprives him of his property. In Greenfield's estate, 14 Pa. 489, Chief Justice
Gibson in his decree of the court of Nisi
Prius sitting in equity said, "If a party
who can read as Mrs. Greenfield could, will
not read a deed put before him for execution, or if being unable to read, will not
demand to have it read or expiained to
him, he is guilty of supine negligence,
which I take it is not the subject of protection, either in equity or at law." The
Supreme Court in sustaining the decision
of the above cited case said, "Nay, the
authorities show that, usually, if one who
is about to execute an instrument can read
it, and neglects to do so; or being blind or
illiterate chooses to act without the contents being made known to him, he will be
bound by it though it turn out to be con-

trary to his mind." The great weight of
authority takes the same view. Johnston
v. Pattison, 114 Pa. 398; Weller's Appeal,
103 Pa. 594; Bauer and others v. Roth and
another, 4 Rawle's Reports 83. The following cases decide that when an illiterate
man executes a writing which has been
falsely read to him, he is not bound: Green
v. North Buffalo Township, 56 Pa. 110;
Schuylkill Co. v. Copley, 67 Pa. 386; Thoroughgood's Case, 2 Coke 9, is in accord
with the above cited authorities. There
is nothing in the case at bar which shows
that Noblet was illiterate. In both of the
above cited cases, the plaintiffs were not
guilty of negligence.
Had Noblet notbeen guilty of negligence,
the deed conveying his property to Harris
would have been invalid even as against
Risk the bona fide purchaser for value.
Weller's Appeal, 103 Pa. 594; Johnson v.
Patterson, 114 Pa. 398.
The fact that Harris was Noblet's tenant
and one in whom he might repose confidence and not suspect him of perpetrating
a fraud, will not justify us in holding that
Noblet was not guilty of negligence.
Langley v. Brown, 2 Atk. 202.
This decision will undoubtedly work a
haidship against Noblet and will deprive
him of his property, yet, the hardship
would be greater were the decision against
Risk, who is an innocent bona fide purchaser for value. Before Risk accepted
the mortgage from Harris, he examined
the record and found a deed from Noblet
to Harris, purporting upon its face, to be
perfectly genuine in every respect. The
defendant contends that Harris being
Noblet's tenant and being in possession at
the time of the conveyance would be constructive notice to Risk that the conveyance from Noblet to Harris was fraudulent.
Our answer to this contention is. that the
facts of the case do not show that Risk was
even aware that Harris was Noblet's tenant. There were no circumstances, whatever, surrounding the case that would
arouse his suspicions in the slightest degree but that the conveyance was valid.
The record is sufficient evidence of a valid
conveyance. Murphy v. Nathans, 46 Pa.
512.
It would be a most manifest evasion of
justice, both legal and equitable, to say
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that one who is not in any way connected
with fraud should be made to bear the loss
occasioned by some other person's negligence. Noblet has been guilty of negligence, which the law does not excuse,
therefore he must bear the burden of his
loss.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
HOWARD L. HENDERSON, J.

ESTATE OF JOHN HERSHEY.
Construction of will-Duty of Pxecutor to
'ebuild premises.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Hershey devised as follows:-"I
give and bequeath to Annie Hafey, for and
during her natural life, the use of the
premises occupied by me, situated at 420
Lackawanna Avenue, Scranton, together
with the use of all the furniture and fixtures now in and upon said premises free
of charge, and in addition thereto I hereby
bequeath her the sum of $5000, and instruct
my executors to pay her the sum of $1000
per year for and during her natural life,
said annual sum to be paid monthly on the
first day of the month."
Hershey occupied a certain building as a
residence, except the first story which was
occupied by the 1st National Bank. The
bank paid rent of $2000 yearly for the use
of it.
Since Hershey's death the bank has continued to occupy the first floor, paying rent
to the executor.
Annie Hafey has continued to occupy
the remainder of the premises until August 9, 1900, when an explosion of illuminating gas destroyed the entire building.
Annie Hafey contends:
1. That it is the duty of the executor to
rebuild the premises and permit her to
occupy them.
2. That she is entitled to the rents paid
by the bank.
McK EEHN and BRENNAN for plaintiff.
Devise of use of thing is devise of thing
itself. Wusthoff v. Darcourt, 2 Watts 240;
Rudebaugh v. Rudebaugh, 72 Pa. 271.
"Premises" is synonymous with lands
and tenements. Bowles v. Pomeroy, 21

Ohio 187; McAffie v. Magee, 4 Penny 94;
Hilton's Appeal, 116 Pa. 358.
FRANK and C. M. STAUFFER for Estate.
Annie Hafey took life estate. Burleigh
v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267; Tobias v. Cohn,
36 N. Y. 363.
She therefore sustained the loss and has
no claim on executor. R. R. v. Kerr, 62 Pa.
363; R. R. v. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. 182.
She took only part of building occupied
by him. Perkins v. Jewett, 11 Allen 9;
Bernard v. Martin, 5 N. H. 536.
OPINION OF THE COUItT.

In this case there appears an extract from
the will of John Hershey, and certain extraneous facts, which are presumed to contain all things necessary to a clear and
comprehensive determination of the case.
The interpretation of the word "premises"
as used in the will is vital in the disposal
of this present case.
Igiveandbequeath
to Anna Hafey, for and duringher natural
life, the use of the premises occupied by
me, situated at 420 Lackawanna Avenue,
Scranton, etc."
Testator used the second story for his
living rooms, in fact, he used the entire
building excepting the first floor which
was, and still is, occupied by First National
Bank, as their office; he owned the entire
building and rented to the bank, they paying $2000 annually; after his death the
bank continued to occupy the office paying
the rent to the executor of Hershey's
estate.
Did the testator contemplate a divided
ownership in the building and did he intend to die intestate as to a portion of the
real estate?
We cannot believe that such was his intention. It is clear by reference to the
above extract that Anna Hafey took a life
estate, and itis for us to determine in what
property she took such an estate. Was it
in the second story or the whole building?
We believe in the entire building.
Anna Hafey, apparently, is the sole
object of testator's bounty; he gives her
the life estate under consideration, the use
of all the furniture and fixtures, now in
and upon the said premises free of charge,
and in addition alegacy of $5000 a year,
and further an annuity of $1000 per year
for her natural life. Is it fair to presume, after having provided for her so
bountifully, that he wished to exclude
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her from the enjoyment of a certain comparatively small portion of his estate? If
testator had wished to restrict his bounty
toward Anna Hafey, is it not reasonable
to believe that he would have taken away
or cut down the legacy or annuity, instead
of introducing a divided ownership in a
certain building?
The word "premises" is, as learned counsel for plaintiq argued, a very comprehensive word, and has been held synonymous
with "lot," Taylor v. Brooke, 3 Maul and
Selwyn 170, and with "lands and tenements," according to the intention of the
testator in each case. Suppose a vacant
lot; it is properly called premises; let us
erect a building and we still have premises
and the building is included. Let us suppose a two story building completely covering a city lot and the first floor fully
occupied; one occupying the remainder of
the premises would necessarily occupy the
remainder, of the building.
Testator owned the entire premises at
420 Lackawanna Avenue, and he occupied
them, though not fully, but he lived in a
house reared within the confines of the lot,
so no person can deny that he occupied the
premises. A house, let us say, is occupied
with the exception of one room rented to a
lodger by a party, and he gives a life estate
in the premises occupied by him to a certain person. Would he be held as having
died intestate to that one room when lie
had disposed ofeverything else, and no fair
motive could be found for his intestacy to
that small portion? or, would, in such a
case, "the premises now occupied by me"
situatedatSt. - Pa.," be construed as
a designative phrase, used to point out to
a certainty the subject of the devise? For
the sake of illustration let us suppose a
large house occupied, with the exception
of a small closet rented to a photographer
as a dark room, by testator, and a will containing the phrase in question. Would it
not be construed a designative phrase used
to make the subject of the gift unmistakable? Could any sane person say that it is
the size of the room, instead of the intention of the testator that is to be considered?
Since testator owned the entire building
and no intention of a desire to die intestate
as to a portion is apparent, we take the
phrase: "now occupied by me" as further

III

descriptive of the premises and to make his
intention clear instead of obscure.
Testator executed a will and the reasonable presumption is that lie intended by
that act to die testateas to his en tire estate,
and not to all but a small portion. Leigh
v. Savidge, 14 T. . E. 134.
It is an old maxim "Testacy will be inferred if fair rules of interpretation, and
testator's intention permit it" or, in other
words testacy, is more favored than in testacy, and where one, with a strict interpretation, dies testate as to all but a small portion of his estate, the courts will hasten to
construe testacy as to that portion if it can
fairly be inferred.
We believe that John Hershey died believing that he had given Anna Hafey a
life estate in the entire premises on Lackawanna Avenue, and in our opinion this
view is further fortified by reason of the
fact that no other disposal of the bank
property is expressed or can be implied.
Anna Hafey contends, first: "It is the
duty of the executor to rebuild the premises and permit her to occupy them." To
this we reply that he is notcompelled, nor
is it his dutyso to do. He is not an insurer
of the premises and she will have her life
estate in what remains after the fire. As
to the second, viz., "That she is entitled to
the rents paid by the bank to the executor."
We are of the opinion that she is so entitled
and can recover them in the proper action.
She had a life estate in the entire premises,
and is entitled to the rents which are incident to such life estate; they are not assets of Hershey's estate but the property
of Anna Hafey who has the life estate and
is entitled to its fruits, the rents. Towle
v. Twasey, 106 Mass. 100. The executor
holds the rents as constructive trustee for
Anna Hafey. McCoy v. Scott, 2 Rawle
221. Anna Hafey is entitled to the rent
paid by the bank from the time of Hershey's death to the time of the destruction
of the building in question, together with
interest on the same.
MITCHELL, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Two questions only are presented in this
record. The first concerns the proper interpretation of the devise to Anna Hafey,
-"I give and bequeath to Anna Hafey"
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says the testator, "for and during her natural life, the use of the premises occupied
by me, situated at 420 Lackawanna Avenue, Scranton." At 420 Lackawanna Avenue was a building, the front part of the
lower floor of which was, in the testator's
life-time, leased to the First National Bank
while he resided in the remainder of the
house. Was the gift to Anna Hafey a gift
of the house less the part occupied by the
bank, or a gift of the house?
The object of the gift is described as'"the
use of the premises," and the premises are
indicated by the phrases "occupied by me"
and "situated at 420 Lackawanna Avenue." The gift for life of the use of the
premises is, as the learned court below well
says, a gift of the premises themselves for
life. By premises would be naturally
meant the lot, and all the house on it. It
is unusual to grant or devise a life estate
in alot and a part of the house to one person,
and to grant or devise another part of the
house to another. It could not well have
been the testator's intention to give the
soil under the front part of the building to
one person or to let it pass under the in.
testate law, while the second or other
stories of the building covering this soil
were devised to another. And it is very
improbable that he designed to give the
soil under the front portion of the house,
and the second and other stories to Anna
Hafey, while the first story between the
soil and the second story, was allowed to
pass under the intestate law, or was devised
to some other person.
Although testator had not been occupying the front portion of the first story, he
had been having the use of it, and Anna
Hafey will have the use of it if she leases
it and obtains the rent for it. We are convinced that the testator-did not intend to
divide the premises at 420 Lackawanna
Avenue, and devise only one portion of it
to Anna Hafey. It follows, therefore, that
the rents payable by the bank belong to
Anna Hafey. As they have been paid to
the executor of the will, she may either
compel him to pay them to her, or she can
recover them from the bank, as the successor to the reversion.
The other question concerns the duty
of the executor at the expense of the estate, to rebuild the house, after its demoli-

tion by the explosion. The testator has
given the premises to Anna Hafey for
her life. As to the reversion, he has either
died intestate, or he has devised it to another; we know not which, since, unfortunately, the will is not before us. Nothing quoted from the will modifies the ordinary rights and duties of alife-tenantand
the reversioner. Nothing imposes a duty
on the estate at large, to presbrve the premises in the state in which they were, at the
testator's death, or to idemnify the life-tenant for any deterioration which they may
undergo. Itisso entirely clear that, when a
building is destroyed by fire or other casualty, the remainderman is under no duty
to restore it at his own expense, for the
advantage of the life-tenant, that discussion of the question were superfluous. It
is equally clear that, in the absence of a
testamentary direcfion, neither is it the
duty of the executor nor has he the right,
at the expense of the personal estate, to
rebuild the buildings in case they are destroyed. The life tenant takes, with the
premises, the usual hazards. She may
secure idemnity from them, by obtaining
insurance, but she must herself procure
and pay for it. She cannot insist that the
executor shall do this for her.
Judgment affirmed.

REBECCA THORNE vs. SAMUEL
SNIVELY.
Liability of property owner for injury
occurring to child when the child is trespassing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Snively owned a farm along which wAs
a highway. On one end of it was a township school-house. In a depression on*
the farm about s of a mile from the road,
water accumulated to the depth, in some
places, of five feet. In winter time the
school children often came to this pond to
skate. Snively had put up a board at one
corner of his farm, Dext the highway, forbidding all trespassing. On the other
hand he was aware that the school children often defied the warning, but he never
did anything to deter them. On one day
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last January, Harry Thorne, the 8 year
old son of plaintiff, with six other school
children, came to the pond and began to
skate. While skating, the ice broke, he
fell into the water and was drowned. This
is assumpsit to recover $5000 damages for
the death of the child.
CLARK and GRAuL for plaintiff.
A widowed motler has right of action
for wrongful death of child. Act of April
26, 1855; 2 P. & L. 8234, Pa. R. R. Co. v.
Bantom, 54 Pa. 495.
The question of defendant's negligence
must be submitted to the jury. Barthold
v. PhIla., 154 Pa. 109; Hydraulic Works
Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. 332; Schilling v. Abernetby, 112 Pa. 437; Ranch v. Lloyd and
Hill, 31 Pa. 358; Brqnson v. Labrat, 81 Ky.
638.
If a child is injured by agencies of a
character likely to attract children, the
fact that he is a trespasser when injured
will not bar a recovery. Cases cited supra.
LIGHTNER and HARPEL for defendant.
There is not sufficient evidence of negligence here to be submitted to the jury. A
non-suit should be submitted in accordance with the following authorities-Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Pa. 144; McMullen
v. Pa. R. R. Co., 132 Pa. 107; Gills v. Pa.
R. R. Co., 59 Pa. 129; Gramlich v. Wurst,
86 Pa. 74; Rodgers v. Lees, 140 Pa. 475;
Legrand v. Traction Co., 10 Spr. 12; Freehan v. Dobson, 10 Spr. 6.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The action of Rebecca Thorne is predicated upon the attributableness of her
son's death to the negligence of the defendant, Snively. Her evidence being closed,
she encounters the defendant's motion for
a compulsory non-suit. In substance,
therefore, the question before us on this
motion is, may we properly allow the jury,
upon the evidence presented, to infer the
negligence of Snively, and the consequence
of the death of young Thorne from that
negligence?
Snively did nothing connected with the
accident except to put up a board forbidding trespassing on his premises. This
act was not negligence, nor did it superinduce the death of the boy. If negligence
there was, we must seek it in the omissions
rather than in the acts of the defendant.
What then might he have done to avoid
the accident which he failed to do? He
could not have prevented the cold and the
consequent freezing of the water. He

could not have prevented the boys' buying
skates, or bringing them to school and to
the neighborhood of the premises. He
might have prevented the pond by filling
up the depression. He might have prevented access to the pond by enclosing it

in an iiisurmountable fence, or by !:Ilacing
guards about the premises to intimidate
the trespassers or to oppose physical force to
their intrusions. We see nothing else that
could have been done. We are not required
to allow the jury to persuade itself that it
sees anything else.
Ought Snively, then, to have filled up
the depression, pr must we allow the jury
to say that he ought? In some places the
depression was at least, five feet deep.
What was the area of the pond we do not
know. So far as appears, the expense of
filling up the low places may have been
And why should
very considerable.
Snively have incurred it? He invited nobody to skate within, or even to enter upon
the premises. Was he bound to spend
considerable money in changing the contour of his ground, simply to avoid hurt to
those who might possibly commit a wrong
to him, by coming on his land? We cannot think so, nor can we consent that the
jury should say that he should.
Should Snively have erected about his
grounds a fence so high that enterprising
boys or men, bent on skating or other
sport, would not be able to trespass on
them? This would have been, in all likelihood, even more expensive than the levelingof theland. We can neither ourselves
say, nor suffer the jury to say, that he neglected a duty toward Mrs. Thorne or her
son in not erecting and maintaining the
fence.
Similar considerations compel us to refuse to submit to the jury the decision
whether Snively should have stationed
guards at the grounds for the purpose of
driving off the intrusive skaters. He had,
doubtless, a better use for his time than to
act as guard himself, and a better use for
his money than to spend it on the salary
of a guardsman.
We have been guided to this decision by
the cases cited by the learned counsel for
the defendant: Gillespie v. McGo,van, 100
Pa. 144; Feehan v. Dobson, 10 Super. 6;
Rodgers v. Lees, 140 Pa. 475; Gramlich v.
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Wurst, 86 Pa. 74. In Arnold v. City of St.
Louis, 48 L. R. A. 291, the Missouri Court
of Appeals has decided that the drowning
of a child while skating on a pond does
not render the owner of the land liable in
the absence of evidence that it was there
by his invitation or permission. There is
absolutely no evidence in this case of either
invitation or permission.
Sufferance is
not permission, and we cannot permit a
jury to distort, it, if so disposed, into permission.
The counsel for plaintiff has laid special
stress upon Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr,
83 Pa. 332. Although this case was cited
and to an e.xtent followed, in Schilling v.
Abernethy, 112 Pa. 437, its authority for
any clearly expressible principle may be
seriously doubted. It was said in Gillespie
v. McGowan, 100 Pa. 144, to be "authority
only for its own facts," and this seems to
have been the judgment of it in Westerberg v. Railroad Co., 142 Pa. 471; Rodgers
v. Lees, 140 Pa. 475. InSchellingv. Abernethy, supra, the boy was not a trespasser
and the accident happened to him while
he was lawfully walking in an alley.
It too often happens that parents think
everybody else than themselves obliged to
take care of their children, but we are not
yet ready to sanction this opinion by propounding the principle that a jury may
be allowed to make a land-owner liable to
a parent for injury to his boy, simply because he does not spend $50, $100 or $500 in
making it impossible for the boy to commit a trespass upon his premises.
Plaintiff no.n-suit.

articles of any two of these classes were
made. The defendant being alleged to
have violated the ordinance, this is an action before the magistrate to impose the
fine of $25. The ordinance is attached as
(1) unreasonable, (2) beyond the authorization of law, (3) unconstitutional.
HOLCOMB and JOHNSTON for plaintiff.
The ordinance was a proper regulation
under the police power of the state. A
police regulation having for its object the
increase and development of the industries
of the state is a legal regulation. Slaughter
House Cases, 16 Wall 36; Sam Hing v.
Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; Com. v. Alger, 7
Cush. 53; Barbier v. Connally, 113 U.S. 27.
DANIEL KLINE and PIPER for defendant.
The ordinance is unconstitutional as
violating both State and Federal constitutions. Application of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98;
Knudler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. 368; Com.
v. Gas Co., 12 Pa. 318; Lynn v. B. & L.
Assbciation, 117 Pa. 1.
OPINION OP THE COURT.

We are of the opinion that the ordinance
in question is in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The first section of the fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." The term "liberty"
as there used has been defined as "the
right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will,
to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling,
and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation." Pen. v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 399. Of
course, this "liberty" may be restricted by
the state in the exercise of its police power
But we are unable to discover any cases
CITY OF PHILA. vs. JOHN WANA- in which the police power has been so
stretched as to save an ordinance of this
MAKER.
character. On the contrary, in the two
Constitutionality of an ordinance sup- reported cases in which so-called "Antipressing department stores-Applica- Department store"'statutes or ordinances
tion of fourteenth amendment of U. S. have been called in question, they have
constitution.
been declared without hesitation to be unconstitutional. Chicago v. Netcher, 183
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
111. 104; State v. Ashbrook, (Mo.) 48 L. R.
In order to prevent "department stores" A. 265.
Philadelphia passed an ordinance forbidIn State v. Ashbrook, the statute in
ding the combination under one manage- question practically prohibited department
ment of the business of selling hats, shoes, stores by the imposition of a heavy license
dry goods, furniture, harness, books, or tax on the privilege of selling goods from
any two of these classes, and imposing a each one of numerous groups or classes of
fine of $25 for every day on which sales of merchandise, permitting sales to be made
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without license from only one of such
classes or groups, whi!e in Chicago v.
Netcher, the city ordinance expressly forbade the sale of provisions or intoxicating
liquors in any store where dry goods,
clothing, jewelry and drugs are sold. In
the latter case, Mr. Chief Justice Cartwright, speaking for the court, says: "It
certainly cannot be contended that there
is anything in the character of dry goods,
clothing, jewelry and drugs which renders
it dangerous to the public or inimical to the
general welfare, that they should be sold
in the same building with provisions.
General stores have always dealt in all
kinds of merchandise, and no one has ever
imagined that the comfort, safety or welfare of the public was in any manner or to
any extent injured or prejudiced by them."
It is our own judgment that the comfort
and welfare of the community at large is
actually promoted by department stores,
since they are the means of a saving both
of time and money to all consumers. The
only complaint against them comes from
the small shop-keepers, who find themselves unable to compete with the large
establishments. Manifestly, however, it
is beyond the scope of legislative power to
equalize the opportunities of the rich and
the poor. So long as there is no overreaching or oppression of the one class by
the other, the police power cannot properly
be evoked. To hold otherwise would be to
put all private business ab the mercy of the
legislature and municipal councils by giving them unlimited power to divide and
subdivide any lawful business, and to
make it unlawful for any person to carry
on more than a petty portion thereof.
Such an extension of the police power
would certainly be without precedent, and
in our opinion would be a grave departure
from the settled principles of our constitutional law.
Judgment for defendant.

beef, Jaggard inflicted a severe cutting to
his finger. Koler was not present at the
time, but the other employee ran for Wilson, a physician, to come to the shop. He
did so, and dressed the wound and continued to tend it for several days at Jaggard's house. After he ceased to attend
Jaggard, he waited on Koler, to present
his bill which was $25.00. Koler said he
was willing to pay for the service rendered
while in his shop, but not for any further.
This Wilson declined to accept, and sues
Koler for the whole bill.
MINNICx for plaintiff.
Emergency gives agent authority to bind
principal for expenses of procuring pbysician. R. R. v. McMurray, 98 Ind. 358;
22 A. & E. R. R. Cases, 371; 14 A. & E.
Encyclopedia, 918; Swazey v. M'f'g Co.,
42 Conn. 556.
McINTYRE and PoINTs for defendant.
Implied authority of agent is limited by
usual course of dealing in the business in
which he is employed. Jones v. Warner,
11 Conn. 40; Schimmelpench v. Bayard, 1
Peters 290; Schriner v. Stevens, 12 Pa. 258.
OPINION OF TRE COURT.

This case indeed presents a very easy
question for this court to decide; as the
reports are teeming with decisions, bearing directly on the poiuits in question.
In the first place there is nothing in the
statement of facts which would lead us to
the conclusion that the employer, Koler,
was negligent in furnishing poor tools or
defective mAchinery to Jaggard, who was
in his employ.
The next question to be considered, is
whether Jaggard was handling the knife
in a careless or negligent manner. This
certainly must have been the case or he
would not have injured himself. It was
through no fault of Koler that Jaggard cut
and injured himself. It certainly would
be a sad state of circumstances if an employer would be held accountable for an
injury happening to his employee through
his, the employee's, own negligence. An
JOHN WILSON vs. AMOS KOLER.
employee takes certain risks when he
Prineipaland agent-Implied authority. enters the employ of another, which he is
bound to assume and be aware of: Derr v.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Lehigh Valley R. R., 158 Pa. 365. The
Koler conducted a butcher shop, having test of liability of an employer to an em
in his employ two hands, one of whom ployee is negligence, not danger, but here
was Charles Jaggard. In clipping a leg ot I there was no evidence even of danger to a
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he had $100, but he owed it to Farnsley
man of reasonable prudence: Moules v.
and would have to pay it to Farnsley
Canal Co., 141 Pa. 632.
The third and last point to be considered within a week. Thereupon Dailey said
may be put in this form, was the other that if Hector would loan him the $100, he
employee acting within the scope of his (Dailey) would pay it over to Farnsley
authority in procuring the services of Dr. within a week. With that understanding
Wilson to dress the wound, and was he the loan was made, but Dailey failed to
capable of binding the employer, Koler, to keep his promise. Farnsley did not know
pay for such services? We think not. of Dailey's promise until after the money
Koler was not present when the accident was due and he had demanded payment
occurred and therefore did not give his of Hector. He now sues Dailey for $100.
GERY and BoRYER for plaintiff.
consent to have the physician called in to
dress the wound. There are several de1. A contract made for the benefit of a
cisions in this state which will support the third party may be enforced by him, although he is not a party to lb. Wyman's
above statement made by this c6urt. In
Adm. v. Wood. 97 Pa. 216; Kountz v. AltBoyd v. Sappington, 4 Watts 247, Boyd house, 85 Pa. 235, 19 Pa. 273, 9 Barr 229, 17
asked Dr. Sappington to come and see his S. & R. 273, 115 Pa. 611, 119 Pa. 85, 77 Pa.
son, who was ill at his father's house. The 143, 86 Pa. 147, 74 Pa. 472.
2. If a contract is such as to constitute
Doctor hesitated a few minutes, when the
the promisor a trustee for the benefit of a
father said "Doctor you must come; I am
third person, the latter may sue in equity.
afraid my son will die." The son lived 130 Mass. 128, 5 S. & R. 4, 117 Pa. 606.
3. The contract need not be in writing.
with his father, was 32 years of age and
had property of his own. The doctor pre- Justice v. Tallman, 86 Pa. 147; Townsend
v. Long, 77 Pa. 143.
scribed for the son and he recovered. SapTURNER and ADAMSON for defendant.
pington then brought an action against
1. When the contract leaves the promthe father for the services rendered the
by the promisee and
son and was allowed to recover the amount isor subject to a suit
likewise to a third person beneficially inin the lower court. The Supreme Court
terested, the third person cannot sue.
in reversing the judgment of the lower Guthrie v. Kerr, 85 Pa. 303; Justice v.
court stated, "That the demand of fhe Tallman, 86 Pa. 147; Zell's Appeal, 111 Pa.
532; Adams v. Kuhn, 119 Pa. 76; 6 Watts
parent raised no implied promise to pay 182.
for the services rendered the son. A dif2. A promise made by one person to
ferent princille would be very pernicious; another, for the benefit of a third person
who is a stranger to the consideration, will
as but very few would be willing to run
not support an action by the latter. Miller
the risk of calling in the aid of a physician, v. Whipple, 1 Gray 317, 6 Gray 116, 7 Gray
where the patient was a stranger, or of 198. 99 Mass. 68, 107 Mass. 37, 7 W. & S.94,
doubtful ability to pay." See also to the 3 Barr 338, 4 Norris 305.
same effect, Shriver v. Stevens, 12 Pa. 258.
OPInION OF THE COURT.
In view of these facts, we must come to
the conclusion that the plaintiff, Wilson,
Hector was indebted to the plaintiff in
should not be allowed to recover conipen- the sum of$100. Dailey desired to borrow
sation from Koler, and render judgment
from him a similar amount, which was
accordingly.
JAS. N. LIGHTNER, J.
finally given him as a loan for a few days
with the stipulation that he should pay at
the end of the week Hector's debt of $100
ALLAN FARNSLEY vs. HUGH
to Farnsley. Upon the failure of Hector
DAILEY.
to pay after demand, Farnsley brought
Contract--Consideration-Privityof con- this action against the defendant.
tract- Where one hands money to
In general no recovery can be had upon
another with the understandingit is to
be paid to a thirdparty, the thirdparty a contract to which the plaintiff Is not a
party, or when there Is no privity of conmay sue in his own name and right.
tract between plaintiff and defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
But where the contract is made for the exclusive benefit of a person not a party
Dailey asked one Hector If he would
loan him $100 fora few days. Hector said thereto, as where personal property is de
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livered by one person to another on the
promise of the recipient to deliver it over
to a third, who has a beneficial interest in
it-that is, where there is a trust created
for the benefit of the third person, such
third person may enforce the promise by
an action in his own name, although no
consideration has passed from him to the
promisor, and no promise hs been directly
made to him. We cannot see in the case
at bar how the plaintiff can insist that a
trust for the benefit of Farnsley was
created. The money was loaned to the
defendant and the property was to be used
by him, and the indebtedness could have
been extinguished either by payment to
Hector or to Farnsley.
In order that the party beneficially interested may maintain an action, he must
be the only party interested in the payment or delivery. "If, on the otherhand,
a debt already exists from one person to
another, a promise by a third party to pay
such debt is for the benefit of the original
debtor to whom it is made, and can be enforced by him. If it could also be enforced
by the original creditor, the promisor
would be liable to two actions for the same
debt at the same time. Adamsv. Kuehn,
119 Pa. 84; Freeman v. R. R., 173 Pa. 274;
Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts 182; Ramsdale
v. Horton, 3 Pa. 330.
For the reasons above stated we must
enter a non-suit.
ALEXANDER DUNBAR vs.EDMUND

FIELD.
Contract: Maliciousinterferencealone will
not sustain recovermy-Cases of Master
and Servant reviewed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Field had contract for iron work in a
building being erected by Dunbar, and one
Morrison had contract for the stone work.
During the progress of the work, Field had
a disApute with Dunbar about payments,
and refused to go on until certain payments
should be made. Field also went to Morrison and induced him to order his men to
quit work, until such payments to Field
should be made.
The dlelay in thestone work caused dam-

age to the amount of $1000 to Dunbar, and
he now sues Field in trespass for that
amount.
BARR and ELrxEs for plaintiff.
1. An action in tort will lie for malicious
interference with contract. Lumley v.
Gye, 2 El. and B1. 216; Ashly v. White, 1
Smith's L. C. 264; Walker v. Cronin, 107
Mass. 564; Angle v. Chicago etc., R. Co.,
151 U. S. 13; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend 385;
Rice v. Manly, 66 N. Y. 82.
2. The defendant's interference was
malicious. Bouen v. Hall, 6 I. B. D. 338;
Temperton v. Russell, 1 I. B. 715.
OSBORNE for defendant.
1. An action will not lie against one
who, from malicious motives, but without
threats, violence, falsehood, deception, or
benefit to himself induces another to violate hiscontract with plaintiff. Boyson v.
Thorn, 98 Cal. 579; Chambers v. Baldwin,
91 Kentucky 121; Bowsen v. Matheson, 14
Allen 499; Com. v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111.
2. The action for malicious interference
with contract lies only where the relation
of master and servant exists. Forsyth v.
Hooper, 11 Allen 419; Coomes v. Houghton, 102 Mass. 211; Williard v. Richardson,
3 Gray 249.
OPrNION OF THE COURT.

The defendant in this action had contracted with the plaintiff to erect certain
iron work for the plaintiff. One Morrison
had agreed to furnish stone for the same
building. A dispute arose between Field
and Dunbar as to certain payments on account. Whereupon the defendant stopped
working and induced Morrison to do likewise until these disputed sums were paid.
The question as to the right of one party
to a contract to maintain an action for
damages against a person for inducing and
procuring the other party to the contract
to break it has not been the subjent of frequent litigation either in the courts of this
country or England.
One of the first,
Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, while upholding the right of the plaintiff to recover
from the defendant who had maliciously
enticed one Wagner to break her contract
as a singer, placed the decision upon the
ground that the relation of master and
servant had been ipterfered with. Crompton, 5.. says, however, that he does not
wish to be considered as deciding "or as
saying that in no case except that of master and servant isan action maintained for
maliciously inducing another to break his
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contract to the injury of the person with
whom such contract has been made." The
next case is Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B.
Div. 333 is decided upon similar grounds.
The doctrine as there laid down has been
considerably broadened by the American
decisions, though they are not without
conflict. It seems that a recovery may be
had for malicious interference where
threats, violence, fraud, falsehood; deception or benefit to the person inducing the
breach accompanies such act. Walker v.
Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Rice v. Manley, 66
N. Y. 82; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385;
Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601; Jones v.
Stanley, 76 N. C. 355; Van Horn v. Van
Horn, 52 N. J. L. 284; Lally v. Cantwell,
30 Mo. App. 524; Hiremus v. Henessy, 176
I11. 608, 43 L. R. A.797.
Malicious interference alone will not
sustain a recovery. Boysen v. Thorn, 21
L. R. A. 233, 98 Cal. 579; Chambers v.
Baldwin, 11 L. R. A. 545; Glencoe Co. v.
Company, 36 L. R. A. 604.
In the case at bar Field interfered to
benefit himself, it appearing that he secured Morrison to quit work until certain
payments claimed by him were made. We
therefore think that Dunbar should recover.
There is no conflict with this determination in the only Pennsylvania authority,
which seems to incidentally consider this
question. Buchanan v. Kerr, et a,., 159
Pa. 435.
Judgment must therefore be entered for
the plaintiff.

hini, Holmes. He took note of Johnson,
with verbal guaranty by Griggs, and surrendered to Griggs his own note. Johnson did not pay, and Holmes sues Griggs
on his guaranty.
STAUFFER and KERN for plaintifi.
No writing is necessary where the promise is in effect to pay the promisor's own
debt, though the debt of a third person is
incidentally involved. Malone v. Keener,
44 Pa. 107; Elkin v. Timblin, 151 Pa. 491;
Uhler v. Farmers' Bank, 64 Pa. 406.
The guarantor may be sued on an absolute guaranty without first suing the
principal. Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 243;
Johnson v. Gilbert, 4 Hill 178; Kach v.
Melhorn, 25 Pa. 89; Roberts v. Riddle, 79
Pa. 468.
KEMP and KENNEDY for defendant.
Promise to answer for the debt of anotheir
must be in writing. Pa Statute of Frauds.
The creditor must use due diligence to collect from the principal, before he can hold
the guarantor. Kramph's Ex. v. Hatz's
Ex., 52 Pa. 525; Brown v. Brooks, 25 Pa.
210; Gilbert v. Henck. 30 Pa. 205; Woods
v. Sherman. 71 Pa. 100; Rudy v. Wolf, 16
S. & R. 79; McClurg v. Frey, 15 Pa. 293.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
We are of the opinion that the defendant's promise in this case was not without
consideration; nor was it an undertaking
to pay the debt of another and therefore
not void because not in writing. Griggs
was at least interested in procuring his
own ten days note, because execution
thereon mighthave been disastrous to him.
To say the least he simply adopted this
method to gain an extension of time. It
appears nowhere in the statement of facts
that Holmes at any time was willing to
substitute Johnson for his debtor instead
OSCAR HOLMES vs. FRANK
of Griggs, but on the other hand the
GRIGGS.
plaintiff refused to take Johnson's note
without being assured of its payment by
Statute of frauds-Promise to answerfor
Griggs. He (Griggs) being prompted by
debt of another-Right to sue guarantor
self-interest, made the promise on which
withoutfirst suingprincipal.
the plaintiff relied in accepting the note of
Johnson and returning the consideration
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
namely the ten day note of Griggs. There
(riggs owed Holmes $1000, for which
is no reason that we can conceive of why
Holmes held Griggs' note to become due
he should not be held bound by it. It is
in 10 days. One Johnson owed Griggs clearly not a promise to pay the debt of
$1000, for which Griggs held Johnson's
another, within the statute of frauds, but
note to become due in 65 days. Holmes
is in substance an original undertaking of
agreed to accept the note of Johnson, ac- indemnity, based on a good consideration.
companied by a guaranty of payment by
In Nugent v. Wolfe, 3 Pa. 471, Justice
Griggs, in discharge of the latter's debt to
Sterrett says that "when the leading ob-
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ject of the promise is to subserve some interest of the promisor himself, notwithstanding the effect is to pay or discharge
the debt of another, the promise is not
within the statute.
In Malone v. Keener, 44 Pa. 109, J.
Read, from whose opinion we quote in
part holds "it is a general principle which
prevails in all cases under the 4th section
of the statute of frauds, from which our
act is copied, that whenever the defendant's promise is in effect to pay his own
debt, though that of a third person be incidentally guaranteed, it is not necessary
that it should be in writing. The statute
contemplates the mere promise of one man
to be responsible foranother, and cannot be
interposed as a cover or shield against the
actual obligation of the defendant himself.
The common case of a holder of a third
person's note, assigning for value with
guarantee, seems to be clearly referable to
this principle. The assignor owes the assignee and that particular mode of paying
him is adopted. He guarantees in substance his own debt.
The defendant also claims that the guarantor is not liable, because he (the plaintiff)
did not pursue the original maker of the
note to insolvency. In this we cannot concur. The guaranty being for the performance of the original contract according to
its terms, namely the payment of the note,
the guarantor was liable without pursuing the principal or showing his insolvency. To support this doctrine we could
cite a long line of cases, the principal ones
being, Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 243;
Roberts v. Riddle, 79 Pa. 468, and Campbell v. Baker, 10 Wright 245. Such acoutract is in the nature of a suretyship.
Ashton v. Bayard, 21 P. F. Smith 134.
Taking then these principles and applying
them to the case at bar there can but one
conclusion follow.
Judgment must be entered in favor of
the plaintiff.
GERY, J.
DAVID HILTON vs. JOHN ALVORD.
Contract of guaranty or suretyship-Evidence of continuing guaranty.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Williamson, a builder, desiring to obtain hardware from time to time from Hil-

ton, the latter declined to let him have it
without security. Williamson applied to
Alvord, who gave him this letter: "David
Hilton, Sir, I stand liable to you to the
extent of $1,000, for goods that you may
sell to John Williamson, and will pay the
same on notice that it is due." Hilton
sold on 45 occasions goods, the amounts
rauging from $23 to $244 and aggregating
$4443. Williamson paid from time to
time sums amounting to $2950.
These
transactions covered a period of 11 months.
Williamson then ceased to deal with Hilton and declined to pay the balance due.
Hilton notified Alvord, who also refused
to pay.
GERY and McKEEHAN for plaintiff.
The letter addressed to the creditor created a continuing suretyship, unlimited as
to time until revoked. Mason v. Pritchard, 12 East 226; Merle v. Wells, 2 Campb.
413; Heffield v. Meadows, 4 C. P. 595, L.
R.; Ridge v. Judson, 24 N. Y. 64; Estate of
Bentz, 14 Phila. 258.
If the party executing a guaranty leaves
anything ambiguous in his expressions,
the interpretation must be most strongly
against himself. Hargrave v. Sinee, 6
Bing. 244; Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2
How. 426; Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Pet.
122; Lee v. Dick, 10 Pet. 493; Bank v.
Kaufman, 93N. Y. 273; Bent v. Hartshorn,
42 Mass. 24; Bank v. Peck, 28 Vt. 200.
SHIPMAN and ADAMsON for defendant.

A letter of credit authorizing credit to
be given to the bearer for any sum not exceeding an amount certain, renders the
writer liable ouly for the first credit given.
Aldricks v. Higgins. 16 S. & R. 212; Rogers
v. Warner, 8 Johns 120; Anderson v.
Blakely, 2 W. & 8. 237.

A letter of credit does not create a liability unless the writer have notice of the acceptance of the guaranty. Kay v. Allen,
9 Pa. 320; Kellogg v. Stockton, 29 Pa. 460;
Evens & Co. v. MeMormick,
167 Pa. 247;
Coe v. Buehler, 110 Pa. 366.
In order to recover from the guarantor
the plaintiff must show the insolvency of
the princil)al. Johnston v. Chapman, 3
P. & W. 18; Bickel v. Anner, 9 Phila. 499;
Isett v. Hodg~e, * W. 128; Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 243; Hartman v. Bank, 103 Pa.
582.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The evidence of the plaintiff being
closed, the defendant moves the court to
enter a judgment of compulsory non-suit.
It is perhaps unnecessary to decide to
which of the two classes of contracts, suretyship or guaranty, the contract on which

THE FORUM.
Alvord is sued belongs. There are collateral contracts by which B becomes bound
to do precisely what A is bound to do, and
on precisely the same conditions. There
are others in which B undertakes to do
what A is at the same time undertaking,
or has already undertaken, to do, but only
on conditions which do not qualify A's
obligation. The former are termed suretyship, thelatter guaranties. Alvord declares
to Hilton that he "will pay" $1000 "on
notice that it is due." His obligation becomes consummate when (1) Williamson.
in consequence of buying goods, owes
$1,000 or any less sum, and (2) Hilton informs Alvord of this fact. The ordinary
contract of guaranty conditions the liability of the guarantor on the creditor's
inability, proven usually by unsuccessful
suit, to compel payment from the principal. The parties can make any form of
contract they choose. Alvord has chosen
to requite of Hilton simply a notice that a
sum of money is due. Hilton, then, was
not obliged to sue Williamson, or to excuse
the omission to sue by independent proof
of the insolvency of the latter.
The defendant contends that his contract was simply to see that Hilton was
paid for the first goods sold by him to
Williamson, to the worth of $1,000. That
being so, it would follow that Alvord's liability expired when Williamson paid $1,000
for goods bought by him since the making
of the contract. Hilton is suing for the
price of the fourth thousand dollars' worth
of goods sold, and, of course, cannot compel Alvord to pay it if Alvord did not contract to pay it.
We think it our duty to put a fair interpretation on thq contract; that is, that interpretation which Alvord should have
expected Hilton to put on it in view of its
phraseology and the ordinary conduct of
men related as he was to Williamson and
Hilton. We cannot accept the canon that
the language must be interpreted most
strongly against the inventor of it. It
seems to us unlikely that Alvord intended
to become liable for any goods bought
three, six or nine years afterwardq. and
after goods worth 5$.000, $6.000 or $20,000
had been bought, and we c-,nnot persuade
ourselves that Filton should have inferred
that he did. That this inference was in
fact drawn, possibly the continued sales to
Williamson indicate, though the eviden. il-value.ofthis fact is weakened by the

circumstance that credit has been given to
the latter to the extent of $1448, $448 in
excess of the sum guaranteed. It may be
then that Hilton, in continuing to make
the sales after the first $1000 worth, was
influenced by thecredit of Williamson and
not that of Alvord. But although Hilton
did think that he had the liability of Alvord for his successive sales, he could not
impose that liability by so thinking, if,
under the circumstances, he ought not to
have thoughtso. InAnderson v. Blakely,
2 W. &. S. 237, where no limit to the liability was expressed, Sergeant, J., points outa
certain unlikelihood that a continuing
guaranty should be intended. Cf. also
Aldricks v. Higgins, 16 S. & R. 212. The
language employed by the surety in
Bentz's Estate, 14 Phila. 258, is not given,
but it is stated that he became surety for
the payment "of all future bills or indebtedness." We think that a reasonable interpretation confines the undertaking of
Alvord to the first $1000 worth of goods
bought by Williamson.
The defendant maintains that Hilton
should have given notice to Alvord of his
acceptance of his undertaking. We had
occasion, in Caplon v. Saktone, 2 Forum
81, to consider the necessity of this notice
What its function is, it is difficult certainly
to say. Some cases treat it as an acceptance of the offer of the guaranty, and
therefore an element of the contract.
Others treat it as following the contract
and as an implied condition not of the origin but of the continuance of the obligation arising from the contract. In this
view its office is to apprise the guarantpr
that his guaranty has been acted on, so
that he may either withdraw it, so far as
future transactions are concerned, or so
that he may take steps to procure indemnity from the principal debtor. Whatever
its object, the cases cited in Caplon v. Saketone and by the learned counsel for the defendant make it indispensable. The dealings of Williamson and Hilton covered
eleven months and the price of the goods
sold amounted to $4443, and no notice was
given to Alvord that his assumption had
been or was being acted upon.
The cases holding notice to the collateral
obligor necessary have been usually cases
of guaranty. But the necessity is not attached to the classification. Whether Alvord's undertaking is a suretyship or a
guaranty, it was an offer of an obligation.
Its acceptance wa necessary either by
wArd or by the act of sale, and there was
the same need of information to Alvord of
such acceptance, in order that he might
terminate his liability as to future transactions or take measures to protect himself
from loss.
It is unnecesksary to notice the other objection urged against a recovery by the
plaintiff. For the reasons suggested supra.
Plaintiff nonsuit.

